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FRAUD, WITHDRAWAL & DISCLOSURE: WHAT
TO TELL THE LAWYER WHO STEPS
INTO MY SHOES
I. INTRODUCTION
Tammy is a lawyer working for the firm of Deebs &
Kelmer.1 Fulco, a major petroleum manufacturer, retains
Tammy to litigate claims relating to its refining operations.
In its refining operations, Fulco produces four different waste
products, each with a different toxicity level. The disposal of
this waste is regulated by government standards. Each dif-
ferent waste must be disposed of in a different government
dump site with great price variances between the sites; as the
toxicity of the waste increases, so does the price of disposal.
Tammy learns that Fulco has "mismarked" its toxic waste
products in the past so that they may be dumped in the
lower-grade dump sites. By mislabeling the waste, the com-
pany has saved hundreds of thousands of dollars. The lower-
grade waste sites, however, are not equipped to treat the
more toxic wastes, and eventually this waste, known to be
carcinogenic, will seep into the groundwater of nearby
communities.
Tammy immediately informs the company's board of di-
rectors and informs them of the illegality of this practice and
the possible ramifications for the communities involved.2
She also informs them of the detriment it could cause Fulco if
the information ever became public. The Chairman of the
Board thanks her for bringing the practice to the company's
attention and assures her that it will not continue.
1. The following example is purely hypothetical. Any similarity this hypo-
thetical example may have to real events or cases is purely coincidental. Hypo-
thetical examples similar to this are used by legal ethics teachers and scholars
across the country.
2. According to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, a corporate law-
yer is required to go to the highest acting authority within the corporation and
inform that person of the legal violation. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.13(b)(3) (1983). The lawyer must also inform the constituents
that the client is the corporation and the actions being taken are adverse to the
interests of the corporation. See id. at Rule 1.13(c); see also CALIFORNIA RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-600 (1994).
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Tammy, not reassured by the Chairman's promises, de-
cides to withdraw from the representation of Fulco (the situa-
tion would be no different if, upon hearing what Tammy
knew, Fulco had terminated her services), and the company
accepts her withdrawal without hesitation. The Chairman,
however, reminds Tammy that all information about the cor-
poration she obtained while working there is strictly confi-
dential. Specifically, he requests that all documentation re-
garding the illegal toxic dumping be delivered directly to him.
The Chairman makes a special point to admonish Tammy re-
garding her duty to keep that information confidential.
Fulco now retains the legal services of attorney Pat Rasic
to replace Tammy. He makes no inquiry as to why she has
decided to terminate her representation. Tammy now faces
the dilemma of whether or not to tell Pat why she withdrew
from representing Fulco.
This hypothetical example presents issues a lawyer con-
fronts when he or she withdraws or is discharged from em-
ployment after having discovered a client's criminally fraudu-
lent activity. The scenario poses many problems for Tammy.
Can she or must she disclose the information to parties who
will be affected by the dumping? Can, or must, she take ac-
tion personally against Fulco? What are her obligations to
Fulco now that she has withdrawn? The specific question
this comment attempts to resolve is what a lawyer who has
withdrawn from representation because of her client's fraud-
ulent activity can and/or should be able to tell subsequent
counsel about that activity.
What Tammy will be able to tell her successor counsel
will depend, in large part, upon the ethical rules that have
been adopted by the jurisdiction in which she is practicing.
Although the ABA has attempted to draft a set of rules that
provide recognizable guidelines for lawyers to follow, none of
the several drafts have been entirely adequate, especially
with respect to confidentiality and termination of employ-
ment.' The American Bar Association's (ABA) Model Code of
Professional Responsibility (Model Code) and Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (Model Rules) address the issue only by
3. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHics (1990)
(giving a clear, concise discussion of the inadequacies and contradictions in the
different sets of ethical rules).
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inference.4 The California Rules of Professional Conduct
(California Rules) are similar to the Model Rules, and they
also offer little guidance.
Lawyers today, however, need a definitive set of rules
that will not leave them guessing when faced with an ethical
dilemma. The walls that once protected attorneys from suits
by third parties and from indemnification are beginning to
crumble,5 and the threat of a malpractice suit constantly
hangs over their heads. Consequently, lawyers are practicing
law from a defensive posture, unsure of their ethical respon-
sibilities. This benefits neither the clients nor the public at
large. When the lawyer is unsure of what his or her ethical
responsibilities are, he or she must make an educated guess.
Guesswork leads to inconsistency. Clients then become hesi-
tant to reveal everything to their lawyer, fearing that the
lawyer may reveal it to the public. There are also instances
when the general public is harmed because of a lawyer's deci-
sion that it was his or her duty not to reveal information that
eventually caused detriment to a third party.6
Given that the ethical codes provide no significant gui-
dance, this comment focuses on the dilemma a lawyer faces
when he or she is forced to withdraw from the representation
of a client. Specifically, this comment addresses what the
withdrawing attorney must tell the attorney who steps into
his or her shoes.
To answer this question, this comment analyzes what
the current ethical rules provide in the way of guidance for
"corporate" lawyers when their representation is termi-
4. Neither the Model Code nor the Model Rules directly address the issue
of disclosure to subsequent counsel. The rules relating to confidentiality, corpo-
rate clients, and termination of representation touch upon the issue, but none
are directly on point. See generally FREEDMAN, supra note 3.
5. See, e.g., Slotkin v. Citizens Casualty Co., 614 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1979)
(holding the lawyer liable to a third party for false statements he made to them
in the course of his representation of the party they were suing); Seidel v. Public
Serv. Co. of New Hampshire, 616 F. Supp. 1342 (D.N.H. 1985) (denying motion
to dismiss claims against law firm for violation of federal securities laws); see
also generally Stephen Gillers, Ethics that Bite: Lawyers' Liability to Third
Parties, 13 LITIG. 8 (Winter 1987) (discussing new theories under which lawyers
have been held liable).
6. See GEOFFREY C. HAzARD, JR. & SUSAN P. KONIAK, THE LAw AND ETHics
OF LAWYERING 255-72 (1990) (citing In Re OPM Leasing Services, Inc., 13 B.R.
64 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 670 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1982)).
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nated.7 By analyzing the various ethical rules8 that attempt
to give lawyers guidance in this area, the shortcomings of
each will become apparent. Section II outlines what each of
the ethical codes provides concerning confidentiality, with-
drawal, and the special obligations of corporate lawyers.
These codes do not specifically address what, if anything, a
corporate lawyer may tell his or her successor. Rather, the
lawyer's duties with respect to her successor counsel must be
inferred from what the codes do provide. Section III describes
various consequences a lawyer could face depending on
whether he or she chooses to disclose the client's illegal activ-
ity to subsequent counsel or to remain silent. In short, none
of these outcomes are very appealing. Therefore, section IV
introduces an ethical code that, if adopted by the ABA, would
provide lawyers clear guidance for obligations to both subse-
quent counsel and former client, thus providing greater pro-
tection for lawyers, clients, and the general public.
II. BACKGROUND
Before delving into the problems with the ethical codes
as they currently exist, it is important to understand their
origins. Each set of rules is different in significant ways from
its predecessors and contemporaries, 9 and it is these differ-
ences that are often the most confusing to lawyers, law stu-
dents, and laymen alike. These differences can most easily
be understood by examining the unique concerns prevalent at
7. Most jurisdictions have adopted a specific ethical rule regarding the
representation of an organization. The so-called "entity theory" makes the or-
ganization itself the lawyer's client. See infra text accompanying notes 67-71.
8. There have been various sets of rules that lawyers have used to guide
themselves when faced with ethical dilemmas. The ABA's Canons of Legal Eth-
ics was adopted in 1908 and used, with various modifications and additions, for
more than half a century. In 1969, the ABA adopted the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility. The Model Code was quickly adopted almost verbatim by
most states. There was immediate negative response to the Code, leading to
the drafting of the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, which, after
much discussion and redrafting, was adopted by the ABA in 1983. States have
been much slower to adopt this set of rules, and when they do, it is often with
significant modification. See generally infra text accompanying notes 10-93.
9. One example of these differences can be seen in how each set of rules
treats confidentiality. The Canons of Legal Ethics are significantly more leni-
ent in terms of confidentiality than either the Model Code or the Model Rules.
The California Rules of Professional Conduct, although appearing to adopt
much of the language of the Model Rules, are far more stringent. See infra text
accompanying notes 76-80.
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the time of their drafting. In addition, an analysis of the
changes that were adopted, as well as those that were sug-
gested to the ABA but not formally accepted, provide insight
into why the rules appear as they do today.
A. The Beginning: The Canons of Professional Ethics
(1908)
The Canons of Professional Ethics (Canons), adopted in
1908, were the ABA's first attempt to regulate the conduct of
lawyers. 10  They were not, however, drafted solely for the
purpose of improving the ethical conduct of lawyers. As
Monroe H. Freedman, a leading ethics expert, stated:
[The Canons] were motivated in major part by the large
numbers of Catholic immigrants from Italy and Ireland
and Jews from Eastern Europe beginning in about 1880.
Just as labor unions of the time joined in demanding re-
strictive immigration laws to restrain competition for
jobs, the established bar adopted educational require-
ments, standards of admission, and "canons of ethics"
designed to maintain a predominantly native-born, white,
Anglo-Saxon, Protestant monopoly of the legal
profession. 11
Thus, phrases such as "[t]he lawyer should aid in guarding
the Bar against the admission to the profession of candidates
unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral charac-
ter or education" 2 were read broadly to blanket whole groups
10. Canons 1-32 were adopted in 1908. Canons 33-47 are amendments that
were adopted at later dates. See generally CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
(1936).
11. FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 3. Monroe H. Freedman is considered to be
one of the leading experts in the field of legal ethics. See Chris Goodrich, Ethics
Business, CAL. LAWYER, July 1991, at 36.
12. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 29 (1908). Canon 29
provides:
Lawyers should expose without fear or favor before the proper
tribunals corrupt or dishonest conduct in the profession, and should
accept without hesitation employment against a member of the Bar
who has wronged his client. The counsel upon the trial of a cause in
which perjury has been committed owe it to the profession and to the
public to bring the matter to the knowledge of the prosecuting authori-
ties. The lawyer should aid in guarding the Bar against the admission
to the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in
either moral character or education. He should strive at all times to
uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to
improve not only the law but the administration of justice.
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of people and thereby exclude them. 13 It is from these auspi-
cious beginnings that rules governing a lawyer's "ethical"
conduct arose.
Regardless of the motivation behind promulgating the
Canons, they still served an important regulatory function.
Not only were the Canons the sole adopted code of ethics for
over fifty years, but they also served as a springboard for the
ethical codes that followed. Specifically, the Canons provided
three sections that are relevant for the purposes of this com-
ment: Canon 37 (Confidences of a Client),1 4 Canon 41 (Dis-
covery of Imposition and Deception),15 and Canon 44 (With-
drawal From Employment as Attorney or Counsel).16  As
13. See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 123-27 (1976).
14. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 37 (1936).
It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences. This
duty outlasts the lawyer's employment, and extends as well to his em-
ployees; and neither of them should accept employment which involves
or may involve the disclosure or use of these confidences, either for the
private advantage of the lawyer or his employees or to the disadvan-
tage of the client, without his knowledge and consent, and even though
there are other available sources of such information. A lawyer should
not continue employment when he discovers that his obligation pre-
vents the performance of his full duty to his former or to his new client.
If a lawyer is accused by his client, he is not precluded from dis-
closing the truth in respect to the accusation. The announced inten-
tion of a client to commit a crime is not included within the confidences
which he is bound to respect. He may properly make such disclosures
as may be necessary to prevent the act or protect those against whom
it is threatened.
Id.
15. Id. at Canon 41.
When a lawyer discovers that some fraud or deception has been
practiced, which has unjustly imposed upon the court or a party, he
should endeavor to rectify it; at first by advising his client, and if his
client refuses to forego the advantage thus unjustly gained, he should
promptly inform the injured person or his counsel, so that they may
take appropriate steps.
Id. (emphasis added).
16. Id. at Canon 44. The entire text of the rule reads as follows:
The right of an attorney or counsel to withdraw from employment,
once assumed, arises only from good cause. Even the desire or consent
of the client is not always sufficient. The lawyer should not throw up
the unfinished task to the detriment of his client except for reasons of
honor or self-respect. If the client insists upon an unjust or immoral
course in the conduct of his case, or if he persists over the attorney's
remonstrance in presenting frivolous defenses, or if he deliberately dis-
regards an agreement or obligation as to fees or expenses, the lawyer
may be warranted in withdrawing on due notice to the client, allowing
him time to employ another lawyer. So also when a lawyer discovers
that his client has no case and the client is determined to continue it;
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with most of the Canons, each of these are broad, general
statements that allowed the lawyer substantial discretion.
1. Confidentiality under the Canons
Canon 37 was significant because it allowed disclosure of
client confidences where the client intended to commit a
criminal act. 17 The Canon stated that when it was "[t]he an-
nounced intention of a client to commit a crime ... [the law-
yer] may properly make such disclosures as may be necessary
to prevent the act or protect those against whom it is
threatened.18  By using the broad terminology "a crime"
rather than designating any specific types of criminal activ-
ity, as in subsequent codes, the lawyer governed by the Ca-
nons was free to disclose any and all potential future crimes
her client was intending to commit. Criminal activity is thus
broad enough to cover even non-felonious criminal conduct,
and if applied today this standard would, for instance, allow a
lawyer to disclose the fact that a client intended to speed on
the freeway on the way home from work.
2. Fraud
Canon 41 provided even more expansive authority for the
lawyer to reveal client confidences in cases of client fraud. 19
This freedom of disclosure, however, was short-lived. Shortly
after these canons were added in 1928, there was a great deal
of discussion that they created inherent conflicts in the rules.
Specifically, it was argued that these later canons authorized
disclosure where it was previously not allowed. 20 These con-
flicts were resolved in 1953 with ABA Formal Opinion 287.21
or even if the lawyer finds himself incapable of conducting the case
effectively. Sundry other instances may arise in which withdrawal is
to be justified. Upon withdrawing from a case after a retainer has been
paid, the attorney should refund such part of the retainer as has not
been clearly earned.
Id.
17. Id. at Canon 37.
18. Id. (emphasis added).
19. Id. at Canon 41. See also supra note 16 for the text of this Canon.
20. Canon 6, adopted in 1908, provides that it is the lawyer's "obligation to
represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or
confidences.... " CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 6 (1908). The amendments,
added in 1928, appear to contradict this rule. See supra text accompanying
notes 15-19.
21. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 287
(1953).
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The ABA Committee on Professional Ethics stated in the
Opinion that the lawyer was obligated to try to persuade the
client to reveal the truth, but if the client refused, the law-
yer's duty was to remain silent.22
3. Withdrawal
Initially, the Canons provided very liberal language re-
garding withdrawal from client representation.23 Canon 44
provided that "[s]undry other instances may arise in which
withdrawal is justified."24 In 1965, however, the ABA Com-
mittee on Professional Ethics in Opinion 314 prohibited the
lawyer from "waving the red flag."25 This essentially pre-
cluded the lawyer from withdrawing if withdrawal would in-
form the court that the client was engaging in prohibited
activity.
In sum, the Canons, as initially drafted, allowed the law-
yer a wide range of options when confronting potentially
criminal conduct by her client. These options were severely
limited as the legal community began to place more value on
the client's right to have disclosures remain confidential. The
lawyer's ethical beliefs took a back seat to the client's right to
have confidential communications remain confidential.
B. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1969)
In 1969 the ABA adopted the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility.26 The preface to the Model Code stated that
the Canons "failed to give adequate guidance, lacked coher-
ence, omitted reference to important areas of practice, and
did not lend themselves to meaningful disciplinary enforce-
ment."27 The Model Code attempted to resolve these defi-
ciencies. The Code was adopted, with some minor variations,
by almost all jurisdictions. 28  Despite its good intentions,
22. See FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 91.
23. See CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 44 (1936). See also supra
note 16.
24. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 44. See supra note 16.
25. See FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 93.
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however, the Model Code came under almost immediate
criticism."9
The Model Code suffered from many of the same
problems as the Canons. The Code was criticized for being
"internally inconsistent, ambiguous, unrealistic, and harmful
to effective service to clients."3 ° In spite of these criticisms,
however, the Model Code is still followed today, with modifi-
cations, in approximately half of the states.31
1. Confidentiality under the Model Code
The principal confidentiality provision in the Model Code
is Disciplinary Rule (DR) 4-101.32 The Rule is broken down
into four parts. First, the Rule defines both the information
to be protected and the scope of the duty.33 Second, it sets out
certain exceptions.34 Third, it provides for disclosure and use
of confidential information by the lawyer's agent.3 5 The ques-
tion of client fraud is treated separately in DR 7-101(B)( 1).36
Finally, DR 4-101 redefines confidential information. It
breaks it down into two subcategories: confidences and
secrets.37 A "confidence" is information that would be pro-
tected under the attorney-client privilege, and a "secret" is
information acquired in the professional relationship that the
client has requested remain inviolate or that would be dam-
aging to the client if released.3 8 For purposes of disclosure
under DR 4-101, however, this distinction makes very little
difference. The lawyer's duty, in either case, subject to an ex-
ception, is to keep the information confidential. 9 Even
though the distinction matters little in terms of DR 4-101, it
29. One expert stated that the Code was "incoherent, inconsistent, and un-
constitutional," and noted that application in malpractice of the Model Code's
ambiguous and contradictory provisions would be "unfair to members of the
bar." Id. at 4.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 91.




36. See generally HAZARD & KONIAK, supra note 6, at 242.
37. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1969).
38. See infra text accompanying notes 46-52.
39. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(B) (1969).
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does have importance in how those terms relate to other
rules. 4
0
DR 4-101(C) lists those situations in which the lawyer
may reveal confidences or secrets. 41 It appears from the lan-
guage of DR 4-101(C)(3) that the lawyer is permitted to re-
veal information demonstrating his or her client's intention
to commit a crime and the details necessary to prevent the
client from committing a crime. DR 4-101(C)(2) also allows
the lawyer to reveal "[c]onfidences or secrets when permitted
under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order."
42
Furthermore, DR 4-101(C)(4) provides a self-defense excep-
tion in which the lawyer is allowed to reveal confidential in-
formation to exonerate herself, if she is implicated in her cli-
ent's criminal conduct.43
2. Fraud
The ability to reveal confidences in a wide range of cir-
cumstances is also bolstered by the rule regulating confi-
dences in situations of client fraud, DR 7-101. 4 4 As it was
originally drafted, DR 7-101 not only allowed, but mandated
that if a lawyer received information demonstrating his or
her client had perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal
in the course of the representation, he or she should reveal
the fraud to the affected party.45 A clause was added subse-
quently, however, providing that the lawyer should not reveal
information relating to the fraud if that information was re-
40. See infra text accompanying notes 46-52.
41. DR 4-101(C) begins with the phrase: "A lawyer may reveal." See MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C) (1969) (emphasis added).
By using permissive language, lawyers have been left to themselves to decide
whether to reveal client confidences.
42. Id. at DR 4-101(C)(2).
43. Id. at DR 4-101(C)(4).
44. Id. at DR 7-101.
45. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (B) (1969).
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpe-
trated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his
client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so,
he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal, except when
the information is protected as a privileged communication.
(2) A person other than his client has perpetrated a fraud upon a
tribunal shall promptly reveal the fraud to the tribunal.
Id. (emphasis added). The emphasized portion was added to the original text in
1974. See FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 93. The change reflected the ABA's de-
sire to have the communications kept confidential. See id.
1244 [Vol. 34
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ceived as a "privileged communication." 46 This language left
open the question of whether a "secret" was a privileged com-
munication. That question was resolved by the ABA Commit-
tee on Professional Ethics Opinion 341 (1975). 4 7 This Opin-
ion reaffirmed Opinion 28748 and established that the ethic
of strict confidentiality was here to stay.
3. Withdrawal
A lawyer working under the Model Code is guided in the
matter of withdrawal by Disciplinary Rule 2-110.4 1 The Rule
is broken down into three subparts. Subsection (A) provides
general guidelines regarding withdrawal. 50 Subsection (B)
provides for mandatory withdrawal. 5' Subsection (C) pro-
vides for permissive withdrawal.52
The key provision in Subsection (B) is section (2), which
mandates a withdrawal where the lawyer "knows or it is ob-
vious that his continued employment will result in violation
of a Disciplinary Rule."5 3 Thus, if the lawyer knows he or she
will violate other rules in the course of representation, his or
her obligation is to withdraw.5 4
Under Subsection (C), a lawyer is permitted to withdraw
under six different circumstances.5 5 A lawyer may withdraw
if his or her client: (1) insists on presenting a warrantless
claim; (2) personally seeks to pursue an illegal course of con-
duct; (3) insists the lawyer pursue an illegal course of con-
duct; (4) renders it unreasonable for the lawyer to continue
the representation; (5) insists on a course of conduct contrary
to the advice of the lawyer; or (6) deliberately ignores a fee
arrangement.56 All of the six appear to be linked directly to
client conduct. Therefore, the ability of the lawyer to with-
draw is ultimately determined by the conduct of the client. In
all cases, however, the lawyer is bound by DR 2-110(A),
46. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (B) (1974).
47. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341
(1975).
48. See supra text accompanying notes 10-31.
49. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110 (1981).
50. Id. at DR 2-110(A).
51. Id. at DR 2-110(B).
52. Id. at DR 2-110(C).
53. Id. at DR 2-110(B)(2).
54. See id.
55. See id. at DR 2-110(C)(1-6).
56. Id.
1245
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which requires the lawyer to do as little harm as possible to
the client upon withdrawal.5 7
4. Organization as Client
The only significant reference in the Model Code to an
organization's clients is Ethical Consideration (EC) 5-18.58
EC 5-18 is the first attempt at creating the "entity theory"
with respect to the corporation. No comparable provision ex-
ists in the Canons. EC 5-18 establishes that the lawyer rep-
resenting an organization represents the organization itself,
as an entity, and not any of its constituents.59 Unfortunately,
establishing the entity theory is all that EC 5-18 accom-
plishes. It does not guide the lawyer in situations where
there is a conflict of interest with constituents of the corpora-
tion, illegality on the part of the constituents, or duties owed
to the corporation upon withdrawal. Consequently, because
of the limited application of this particular code section, it
provides corporate lawyers with very little guidance.
C. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
The Model Code came under almost immediate criticism
after its inception. In 1977, only eight years after promulgat-
ing the Model Code, the ABA appointed a commission to re-
consider it." Critics stated that the Code was "incoherent,
inconsistent, and unconstitutional and.., application in mal-
practice actions of the Model Code's ambiguous and contra-
dictory provisions would be unfair to members of the bar.""'
The Commission concluded that the best solution was to draft
an entirely new set of ethical rules. This decision culminated
in the ABA's adoption of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct in 1983.62
Because the Model Rules are discussed in depth later in
the comment, the relevant rules are discussed only briefly
57. See id. at DR 2-110(A).
58. Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 5-18 states in relevant
part: "A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes his
allegiance to the entity and not to a stockholder, director, officer, employee, rep-
resentative, or other person connected with the entity." MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18 (1981).
59. Id.
60. See FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 4.
61. See id. at 4-5.
62. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983).
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here. Those rules are Model Rule 1.6 (Confidentiality of In-
formation), Model Rule 1.13 (Organization as Client), and
Model Rule 1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation).
1. Confidentiality of Information
Model Rule 1.6 was the most controversial rule during
the drafting debates. 3 In its final form, Model Rule 1.6 is
virtually a flat ban on a lawyer disclosing information relat-
ing to his or her representation of a client. 4 Although Model
Rules 1.6(b)(1) and (2) provide limited exceptions to this
ban,65 they are significantly less permissive than even the
disclosures allowed under the Model Code. Like the Model
Code, the Model Rules permit the lawyer to disclose, but do
not mandate that he or she do so.
66
2. Organization as Client
Model Rule 1.13 goes much further than any previous
ethical rule in defining both the organization as the client
and the lawyer's obligations to the organization as a client. 7
The Rule was designed by the corporate bar for the protection
of its members and their clients .6  The Rule was passed with
virtually no alteration, because the corporate bar threatened
not to agree to the whole body of the Model Rules if Model
Rule 1.13 was altered from the way the corporate bar
63. See FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 99.
64. Model Rule 1.6(a) reads: "A lawyer shall not reveal information relating
to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except
for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the represen-
tation, and except as stated in paragraph (b)." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(A) (1983).
65. Model Rule 1.6(b) provides:
A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that
the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial
bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to
a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct
in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any
proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
Id. at Rule 1.6(B).
66. See id.
67. See id. at Rule 1.13.
68. See FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 197-203.
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designed it. 69 The corporate bar's attempt to shield itself and
its clients from liability was at first a powerful tool. v0 The
public's ever-increasing demand that professionals be held
accountable, however, has begun to take its toll.v" Corporate
lawyers who were once able to stand on the firm ground of
protection granted to corporations are finding that they may
not be able to walk away when their clients are mired in the
quicksand of public ridicule.
3. Withdrawal
Model Rule 1.16 expands the reasons for which a lawyer
may seek permissive withdrawal.7 2 Unlike Model Code 2-
110, the Model Rules allow the lawyer to withdraw without
69. See id.
70. "[Plersons not in privity with the lawyer, including the investing public
and the client's adversaries or opponents, had no claim. The lawyer's status as
a lawyer afforded him a shield against liability that no other participant en-
joyed." Gillers, supra note 5, at 8; see also infra text accompanying notes 88-
93.
71. Lawyers are not the only professionals who have seen an increase in
actions by third parties. Accountants have also realized these increased risks.
See, e.g., First Federal Savings and Loan Assoc. of Pittsburgh v. Oppeinheim,
Appel, Dixon & Co., 629 F. Supp. 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). But see Bily v. Arthur
Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (1992) (holding that (1) auditors owe no general duty
of care to certain non-clients for negligent misrepresentation; (2) plaintiffs must
demonstrate privity of contract for negligence actions against accountants; and
(3) claims by non-client third parties against accountants are limited to those
based on a negligent misrepresentation theory).
72. Model Rule 1.16(B) provides:
(b) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw
from representing a client if withdrawal can be accomplished without
material adverse effect on the interests of the client, or if:
(1) the client persists in a course of action involving the law-
yer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or
fraudulent;
(2) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a
crime or fraud;
(3) a client insists upon pursuing an objective that the law-
yer considers repugnant or imprudent;
(4) the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the
lawyer regarding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable
warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is
fulfilled;
(5) the representation will result in an unreasonable finan-
cial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult
by the client; or
(6) other good cause for withdrawal exists.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(B) (1983).
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cause, so long as withdrawal would not harm the client.73
Thus, withdrawal is not as client-driven as it is under the
Model Code. 74 Model Rule 1.16 also allows for six circum-
stances where the lawyer may withdraw even if the with-
drawal will have adverse consequences for the client."5 The
mandatory withdrawal provisions76 are essentially the same
as those provided in the Model Code.77
D. The California Rules of Professional Conduct
1. Confidentiality
In California, the lawyer's duty of confidentiality is not
addressed in the current California Rules of Professional
Conduct (California Rules).78 Instead, it appears in the Cali-
fornia Business and Professions Code.79 Under section
73. Id.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 28-59.
75. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(B) (1983). See also
supra note 72.
76. Model Rule 1.16(A) provides:
(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a
client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from
the representation of a client if:
(1) the representation will result in violation of the rules of pro-
fessional conduct or other law;
(2) the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs
the lawyer's ability to represent the client; or
(3) the lawyer is discharged.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(A) (1983).
77. See supra notes 53-54.
78. But see CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-100 (Pro-
posed draft 1992). This rule reads in relevant part:
(A) It is the duty of a member to maintain inviolate the confidence,
and, at every peril to himself or herself, to preserve the secrets of a
client.
(C) A member is not subject to discipline who reveals a confidence or
secret:
(1) With the consent of the client; or
(2) To the extent the member reasonably believes necessary to
prevent the commission of a criminal act that the member believes is
likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm.
Id. This rule has been proposed to the California Supreme Court for approval
and will likely be approved in the near future.
79. In California, confidentiality is regulated by California Business and
Professions Code § 6068(e). This provision states: "It is the duty of an attorney
to do all of the following: .... (e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at
every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her client."
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West Supp. 1994).
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6068(e) of the Business and Professions Code, it is very clear
that the lawyer is bound to keep all client confidences abso-
lutely confidential.8 0 At present, however, there are no ex-
ceptions similar to those contained in the Model Rules that
allow a lawyer practicing in California to disclose client
confidences.81
2. Withdrawal
If a lawyer has taken all of the actions required by Rule
3-60082 and still believes that constituents of the organiza-
tion will act in an unlawful manner, he or she may, or in
some instances must, withdraw according to California Rule
3-700.83 California Rule 3-700 (Termination of Employment)
lists those situations where withdrawal is permissive and
those where withdrawal is mandatory.8 4 The permissive
withdrawal section is essentially identical to that of Model
Rule 1.16.85 The mandatory withdrawal provision is similar
to those incorporated in both the Model Code and Model
Rules. It defines three situations in which the lawyer, re-
gardless of the consequences to the client, must withdraw."
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. These include asking for reconsideration of the matter and referring the
matter to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the corporation. See
CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-600(B) (1989).
83. Id. at Rule 3-600(C):
If, despite the member's actions in accordance with paragraph (B),
the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists
upon action or a refusal to act that is a violation of law and is likely to
result in substantial injury to the organization, the member's response
is limited to the member's right, and, where appropriate, duty to resign
in accordance with Rule 3-700.
Id.
84. Id. at Rule 3-700.
85. Id. at Rule 3-700(C). See also supra note 72 and accompanying text.
86. CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-700(B) (1989).
This rule requires the following:
A member representing a client before a tribunal shall withdraw
from employment with the permission of the tribunal, if required by its
rules, and a member representing a client in other matters shall with-
draw from employment, if:
(1) The member knows or should know that the client is bringing
an action, conducting a defense, asserting a position in litigation, or
taking an appeal, without probable cause and for the purpose of
harassing or maliciously injuring any person: or
(2) The member knows or should know that continued employ-
ment will result in violation of these rules or of the State Bar Act; or
[Vol. 341250
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Although these situations are narrowly defined, 3-700(B) pro-
vides a lawyer with more guidance than does a rule that is
only permissive.
3. Organization as Client under the California Rules
The California Rules do have a specific provision that ad-
dresses corporate clientele.8 7 California Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 3-600 is similar to Model Rule 1.13 but is more
restrictive with respect to what a lawyer may reveal. The key
difference is that a lawyer representing a corporate client in
California is bound by the confidentiality provisions of Cali-
fornia Business and Professions Code section 6068(e).88
E. Opening the Door to a Lawyer's Liability
There was a time when lawyers were almost immune to
lawsuits filed against them by third parties.8 9 The so-called
privity barrier prevented actions by non-clients.90 The
landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.91 began the
gradual unraveling of the privity barrier in personal injury
cases. It was not until recently, however, that this barrier
began to fall in professional services cases. Biakanja v. Ir-
ving,92 decided in 1958, was the first case to break the privity
barrier between lawyers and non-clients. 93 Since that time,
the scope of a lawyer's potential liability to non-clients has
continued to expand. 94 The courts have also been willing to
expand the types of damages that can be collected by clients
who sue their former attorneys. 95
The expansion of potential liability to lawyers has not
been followed by serious expansions or revisions in ethical
(3) The member's mental or physical condition renders it unrea-
sonably difficult to carry out the employment effectively.
Id.
87. See id. at Rule 3-600.
88. "[T]he member shall not violate his or her duty of protecting all confi-
dential information as provided in Business and Professions Code section 6068,
subdivision (e)." Id. at Rule 3-600(B).
89. See HAZARD & KONIAK, supra note 6, at 89.
90. See id.
91. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
92. 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958).
93. See id.
94. See Nancy Lewis, Lawyers' Liability to Third Parties: The Ideology of
Advocacy Reframed, 66 OR. L. REv. 801 (1987); see also Gillers, supra note 5.
95. See, e.g., Tara Motors v. Superior Court, 276 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1990).
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rules. Lawyers are being forced to make very difficult ethical
decisions knowing that a lawsuit could result no matter
which course is followed.
III. ANALYsis
The steady progression (or, in some instances, regres-
sion) of ethical rules has been driven in large part by the
changing concerns of the ABA. The concerns have been
short-sighted, however, and the rules self-serving. Conse-
quently, the climate lawyers are faced with today is one of
almost outright hostility from the general public.
This portion of the comment highlights some of the diffi-
culties today's rules present to lawyers. Specifically, the hy-
pothetical example presented in the introduction section will
be analyzed under the Model Code, Model Rules, and Califor-
nia Rules. Although none of these rules specifically address a
lawyer's disclosure obligations to successor counsel, an analy-
sis of what these rules do provide will yield an understanding
of what a lawyer can or must do under the rules as they stand
in their current form.9
6
A. The Model Code
1. Fulco as the Organization
As noted earlier, the Model Code minimally addresses
the issue of representing organizations as clients.9v Tammy
represented the entity, Fulco. Consequently, according to
Model Code EC 5-18, she owes her "allegiance to the entity
and not to a stockholder, director, officer, employee, represen-
tative, or other person connected with the entity."9 8 It is the
entity, not those who instigated the illegal activity, to whom
Tammy owes her allegiance. Therefore, the Model Code may
be interpreted as requiring Tammy to inform successor coun-
sel of the Board's illegal activity, thus fulfilling the mandate
of Model Code EC 5-18 to keep Fulco's interests "para-
96. Although particular states may have adopted a version that does not
precisely match any of these three ethical codes, most versions vary only to a
slight degree, thus rendering an analysis of each code both useful and relevant
to most jurisdictions. See generally HAZARD & KONIAK, supra note 6.
97. See supra text accompanying note 59.
98. MODEL CODE OF PROFEssIoNAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18 (1981).
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mount."99 In this respect, Fulco would be better protected if
subsequent counsel knew of the previous illegal activity.
It may be also be argued persuasively, however, that by
telling successor counsel of the criminal activity, Fulco may
not be able to find someone willing to act as corporate coun-
sel. Therefore, informing potential successors of the illegal
conduct may not comport with the paramount goal of preserv-
ing Fulco's interests. In sum, Model Code EC 5-18 offers very
little in the way of guidance for Tammy. Although it places
the interests of Fulco above those of any of its constituents, it
is unclear how this affects Tammy's ability to disclose to suc-
cessor counsel.
2. Withdrawal from Representation of Fulco
The withdrawal provisions of the Model Code are not as
vague as are those of Model Code EC 5-18. Model Code DR 2-
110 clearly outlines those instances where withdrawal is
mandatory and where it is permissive. 100 Tammy sought a
permissive withdrawal allowable under Model Code DR 2-
110(C)(5). 101 She would be obligated to take "reasonable
steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of [her] cli-
ent, including giving due notice to [her] client, allowing time
for employment of other counsel, delivering to the client all
papers and property to which the client is entitled, and com-
plying with applicable laws and rules."0 2 Once again, the
question becomes, would disclosing Fulco's criminal activity
to successor counsel prejudice Fulco's rights? As with Model
Code EC 5-18, the argument cuts both ways. Disclosure may
be seen as prejudicing the client, but non-disclosure may also
prejudice the client's position. Consequently, Tammy must
decide whether to disclose, with essentially no guidance from
the ABA.
99. Id.
100. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110 (1981).
101. Id. at DR 2-110(C)(5). Model Code DR 2-110(C)(5) reads: "If DR 2-
110(B) is not applicable, a lawyer may not request permission to withdraw in
matters pending before a tribunal, and may not withdraw in other matters,
unless such request or such withdrawal is because [h]is client knowingly and
freely assents to termination of his employment." Id.
102. Id. at DR 2-110(A)(2).
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3. Fulco and Confidentiality
In contrast to the previous Model Code sections, the con-
fidentiality provisions of Model Code DR 4-101103 do give
some guidance to Tammy. Unless the confidential informa-
tion falls into an exception, Tammy is forbidden to reveal the
information. °4 DR 4-101(C)(1) allows disclosure if Tammy
received consent. 10 5 Clearly, however, she has not received
consent. In fact, she has been admonished specifically to
keep the information confidential.
DR 4-101(C)(3) allows Tammy to reveal information
when it is the intention of her client to commit a crime and
the information is necessary to prevent the crime.' °6 Fulco
has not manifested an intention to commit a crime. Rather,
Fulco has committed only past violations. Although Tammy
may believe the practice will continue in the future, the high-
est authority within the organization gave assurance that it
will not. Therefore, Model Code DR 4-101(C)(3)107 does not
offer a basis that permits Tammy to reveal the
information. 108
Model Code DR 4-101(C)(4) provides what is commonly
called the self-defense exception.' 0 9 The central questions
103. See supra notes 36-41.
104. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1981). DR 4-
101 provides in relevant part:
(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall
not knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client ....
(C) A lawyer may reveal:
(1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or
clients affected, but only after a full disclosure to them.
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Discipli-
nary Rules or required by law or court order.
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the in-
formation necessary to prevent the crime.
(4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect
his fee or to defend himself or his employees or associates against an





108. If the Chairman of the Board had admitted the intent to continue the
practice of illegal dumping, Tammy would be able to reveal this information.
Any time a client manifests the intention to commit a crime, Model Code DR 4-
101(C)(3) permits disclosure so that it may be prevented. See id. at DR 4-
101(C)(3).
109. See supra note 104.
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surrounding this exception are its scope and what triggers a
lawyer's ability to use it. 110 Generally it has been held that a
lawyer may not reveal confidential information in self-de-
fense where that information will be used to instigate a law-
suit against the client."1 Tammy could reveal the informa-
tion to a neutral party, who would in turn keep the
information confidential. By doing so, Tammy protects her-
self in the event of a possible lawsuit against Fulco. If at
some time in the future Tammy is named as a co-defendant
in an action against Fulco, she could present the information
previously given to the neutral party to demonstrate her lack
of liability in the matter.1 2 Successor counsel, however, is
not a neutral party in the hypothetical example. As Model
Code DR 4-101(C)(4) has been interpreted, Tammy would
have no right to reveal the information to successor counsel
under the guise of self-defense.
Under Model Code DR 4-101(C)(2), Tammy would also be
allowed to reveal if permitted by some other Disciplinary
Rule, or if required by law or court order. 1 3 The only con-
ceivable Rule that might allow Tammy to reveal the informa-
tion is Model Code DR 7-102(B)(1).1. 4 This Rule allows the
lawyer to reveal limited information in the case of client
fraud." '5 If a lawyer receives information that the client has
perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, and the client
refuses to rectify the fraud, the lawyer is allowed to reveal
the fraud to the affected individual or tribunal." 6 Undoubt-
edly, Fulco has committed a fraudulent act. Successor coun-
sel, however, is neither the affected party nor the tribunal.
Even if successor counsel could be considered an affected
party, the final clause of DR 7-102(B)(1) places a further limi-
tation on what information may be revealed. 1 7 If the infor-
mation regarding the fraud was received by counsel as a priv-
ileged communication, nothing about it may be revealed." 8
110. See HAZARD & KONLAK, supra note 6, at 250-52; see also Meyerhoffer v.
Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 998 (1975).
111. See HAZARD & KONIAK, supra note 6, at 250-52.
112. See id.
113. See supra note 104.
114. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (B)(1) (1969).
115. Id.
116. See supra note 45.
117. See supra note 45.
118. See supra note 45.
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As such, Tammy would not have the right to reveal anything
to Pat regarding Fulco's fraudulent activities.
4. Applying the Model Code: A Summary
The Model Code allows a lawyer very limited discretion
as to when and to whom he or she may reveal confidential
communications. The ABA generally has held to the ethic of
strict confidentiality.11 But Pat, as successor counsel, is in a
unique position. He will also be privy to privileged communi-
cations from Fulco. He is given the same responsibilities as
Tammy, and Tammy must make the transition as smoothly
as possible so as not to prejudice Fulco. But does this limit
her ability to tell successor counsel of her reasons for with-
drawal? Because the incriminating files were given directly
to the Chairman of the Board of Directors, and Pat has not
asked for any explanation of why Tammy is withdrawing,
Tammy is probably barred from telling Pat of Fulco's illegal
conduct under the Model Code. She was specifically told the
information was to remain confidential, and there is no ex-
ception in the Model Code that permits her to disclose the
information voluntarily to Pat.
B. The Model Rules
1. Fulco as the Organization
The Model Rules have a far more detailed rule regarding
the representation of an organization than the Model
Code. 120 Model Rule 1.13 defines the organization as the en-
tity that the lawyer represents. 121 It then specifies the proce-
dures the lawyer must follow when he or she becomes aware
of illegal conduct by the constituents of the organization.
1 22
Tammy substantially followed all of these procedures. The
actions she took were "designed to minimize disruption of the
organization and the risk of revealing information relating to
the representation to persons outside the organization."'
23
119. This principle was affirmed by the ABA Committee on Ethics and Pro-
fessional Responsibility. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsi-
bility, Formal Op. 341 (1975).
120. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (1983).
121. Id. at Rule 1.13(a). Rule 1.13(a) states: "A lawyer employed or retained
by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly author-
ized constituents." Id.
122. Id. at Rule 1.13(b)-(d).
123. Id.
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She referred the matter to the highest authority that can act
on behalf of the organization. Although the authority gave
assurances that the practice will stop, it is her belief that
Fulco, under the direction of the present Board, will continue
the illegal dumping. She therefore elected to withdraw, and
this withdrawal must be executed in accordance with Model
Rule 1.16.124
2. Withdrawal from Representation of Fulco
The relevant provisions pertinent to withdrawal in
Model Rule 1.16 are subdivision (d)12 5 and comment 9.126
Subdivision (d) tells Tammy very little in terms of what her
obligations are to successor counsel. On its face, it describes
only what her obligations are to Fulco. Comment 9 requires
Tammy to mitigate the consequences of her withdrawal to the
client. The comment suggests that her obligation is to re-
main silent about the illegal conduct. Informing successor
counsel of the conduct essentially puts Fulco in the same situ-
ation it was in once Tammy found out about the illegalities.
This hardly seems to mitigate the consequences of her with-
drawal. 127 An argument can be made, however, that Pat
needs to be informed of the illegal conduct in order for him to
represent Fulco properly. There is nothing in Model Rule
1.16, however, that expressly permits Tammy to inform him.
124. Id. at Rule 1.13(c). Rule 1.13(c) states in relevant part:
(c) If, despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph
(b), the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization
insists upon action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law
and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, the law-
yer may resign in accordance with rule 1.16.
Id.
125. Id. at Rule 1.16(d). This rule states:
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to
the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as
giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of
other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is
entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been
earned. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the ex-
tent permitted by other law.
Id.
126. Id. at Rule 1.16 cmt. 9. "Even if the lawyer has been unfairly dis-
charged by the client, a lawyer must take all reasonable steps to mitigate the
consequences to the client. The lawyer may retain papers as security for a fee
only to the extent permitted by law." Id.
127. It should also be noted, however, that there is nothing in the rule that
suggests Tammy must leave Fulco in a better situation.
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Likewise, although there is an implication that suggests she
should not inform Pat, there is nothing that mandates her
silence.
3. Fulco and Confidentiality
Because neither the organization nor the withdrawal
provisions offer Tammy any firm guidelines regarding disclo-
sures, Tammy must look to a different provision of the Model
Rules. That provision is Model Rule 1.6.128 Model Rule 1.6 is
essentially the ethical equivalent of the attorney-client privi-
lege. The first aspect to note about the Rule is that it begins
with an absolute ban on revealing information related to the
representation. 129 Secondly, the exceptions to this ban are
very limited and strictly permissive. None of the exceptions
mandate that a lawyer reveal information relating to the
representation. 130
Model Rule 1.6 is one of the most controversial provisions
of the Model Rules, with much controversy surrounding the
scope of the Rule. 131 In one sense the Rule is extremely
broad. As explained by comment 5, the Rule "applies not
merely to matters communicated in confidence by the client
128. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983). Rule 1.6
states:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representa-
tion of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the rep-
resentation, and except as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the law-
yer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that
the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial
bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to
a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct
in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any
proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
Id.
129. Id.
130. As a caveat, it must be noted that Model Rule 1.6 comment 19 appears
to suggest that if ordered by a court, the lawyer must divulge the requested
information. In relevant part it states: "[t]he lawyer must comply with the final
orders of a court or other tribunal of competent jurisdiction requiring the law-
yer to give information about the client." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. 19 (1983). This is only a comment, however, and does not
have any binding effect.
131. See id. at Rule 1.6(b)(1).
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but also to all information relating to the representation,
whatever its source. A lawyer may not disclose such informa-
tion except as authorized or required by the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct or other law."13 2  Consequently, anything
Tammy learns about Fulco during her representation is sub-
ject to the Rule, including information regarding Fulco's ille-
gal toxic dumping.
Model Rule 1.6 is extremely narrow in the sense that the
exceptions to the Rule are very limited. As adopted, the Rule
provides for only two instances when a lawyer is allowed to
reveal confidential communications. 133 The fist exception is
Model Rule 1.6(b)(2), 134 which, like Model Code 4-
101(C)(3)' 35 provides a "self-defense" exception. Disclosure,
however, must be as limited as possible. 136 Model Rule 1.6
comment 17 demands the following:
[Djisclosure should be no greater than the lawyer reason-
ably believes is necessary to vindicate innocence, the dis-
closure should be made in a manner which limits access to
the information to the tribunal or other persons having a
need to know it, and appropriate protective orders or
other arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the
fullest extent practicable.
1 37
Under this exception, the lawyer is not required to wait until
charges are formally brought against him or her before he or
she may respond.1 3s Once an assertion of complicity is made,
the lawyer is allowed to present his or her defense.1 39 As
noted earlier in the discussion of Model Code 4-101(C)(3),
however, the self-defense exception does not provide an in-
dependent means by which Tammy is able to disclose to
Pat.1 40 Revealing the information to Pat does not conform to
the limitations suggested by comment 17, because Pat is not
a party who would "need" to know the information in order
for Tammy to establish her defense.
132. Id. at Rule 1.6 cmt. 5.
133. See supra note 128.
134. See supra note 128.
135. See supra text accompanying note 41.




140. See supra text accompanying note 41.
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The other exception to the flat ban on disclosure is Model
Rule 1.6(b)(1), permitting disclosure only where the lawyer
reasonably believes it is necessary "to prevent the client from
committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to
result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm. '"41
This is an extremely limited exception due to the specific pre-
requisites for its application: the client's conduct must not yet
have occurred; the threat to the endangered party must be
imminent; and the lawyer must reasonably believe that the
client will carry out the threat. 142
Given the Rule's broad application and its narrow excep-
tions, a lawyer guided by Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) has very lim-
ited disclosure obligations. 143 The version finally adopted by
the ABA delegates, however, is far more limited than others
that were proposed. In particular, the Revised Final Draft of
June 30, 1982, was significantly more lenient with respect to
voluntarily disclosed confidential information.14 4  As pro-
posed, Rule 1.6(b)(1) allowed the lawyer to disclose when she
reasonably believes it necessary "to prevent the client from
committing a criminal or fraudulent act that the lawyer rea-
sonably believes is likely to result in death or substantial
bodily harm, or in substantial injury to the financial interests
or property of another."'45 This addition would have pro-
tected against future client fraud, not just criminal conduct,
as in the current Rule. Perhaps even more significant in the
proposed draft was subsection (b)(2).146 Proposed Model Rule
1.6(b)(2) would have allowed the lawyer to disclose where he
or she believed it reasonably necessary "to rectify the conse-
quences of a client's criminal or fraudulent act in the further-
ance of which the lawyer's services had been used."1 47 This
allowance for disclosure to rectify a client's past crime or
fraud, though qualified by the fact that the lawyer's services
141. See supra note 128.
142. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1), and com-
ments (1983).
143. See supra notes 128, 130. See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. 15 (1983).
144. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (Revised Final Draft,
1982).
145. Id. (emphasis added).
146. The proposed draft, unlike the adopted draft, had four subdivisions
under subsection (b). The "self-defense" exception in the proposed draft ap-
peared as Model Rule 1.6(b)(3). See id. at Rule 1.6(b)(3).
147. Id. at Rule 1.6(b)(2).
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must have been used in furtherance of the act, still would
have allowed lawyers much greater discretion as to when
they could disclose. This proposal, however, was rejected by a
substantial margin of the voting delegates. 14' This demon-
strates the ABA's continued insistence upon maintaining
strict confidentiality. Consequently, the lawyer is allowed
only very limited discretion to disclose as provided by Rule
1.6. In Tammy's situation, the Rule does not provide her with
an exception that would permit her to disclose Fulco's past
violations to Pat.
4. Comment 15: A Loophole?
There is one other possible exception to Model Rule 1.6
that may allow Tammy to disclose confidential information
concerning Fulco. Model Rule 1.6 comment 15149 advises that
a lawyer is not prohibited from making a "noisy with-
drawal."150 This comment, although not allowing lawyers to
"blow the whistle," attempts to give them considerable lati-
tude in "waving the red flag."15' Thus, in an indirect manner,
the lawyer is allowed to send "signals" to third parties that
his or her former client committed criminal or fraudulent
acts. 152 By giving notice of withdrawal and disaffirming doc-
uments and opinions, the withdrawing lawyer may send a
warning to those parties that may be affected by his or her
former client's illegal conduct. For Tammy, this would mean
she could inform Pat that she has withdrawn or disaffirmed
any of the work she did for Fulco concerning the toxic dump-
ing. She may not be able to inform him of the contents of
such documents, but a noisy withdrawal would inform him of
148. The margin was 207 to 129. See FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 99.
149. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. 15 (1983). Com-
ment 15 reads:
After withdrawal the lawyer is required to refrain from making
disclosure of the clients' confidences, except as otherwise provided in
Rule 1.6. Neither this Rule nor 1.8(b) nor Rule 1.16(d) prevents the
lawyer from giving notice of the fact of withdrawal, and the lawyer
may also withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or
the like.
Id.
150. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Notice of Withdrawal and the New Model Rules
of Professional Conduct: Blowing the Whistle and Waving the Red Flag, 63 OR.
L. REV. 455 (1984).
151. See 1 GEOFFREY C. HAzARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAw OF LAWYER-
ING, 188 (2d ed. 1991 Supp.); see also FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 100-102.
152. See supra note 127.
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the documents' existence and the possibility of illegal conduct
by Fulco.
Comment 15 was heavily criticized because of the way it
was tacitly incorporated into the Rule 153 and because of its
seeming contradiction of the Rule itself.' A recent ABA
opinion, however, appears to legitimize the exception.15 5 In-
deed, ABA Formal Opinion 92-366156 may even make it a
lawyer's duty to raise the red flag. 157 Although neither Model
Rule 1.6 comment 15 nor ABA Formal Opinion 92-366 are
binding, the two combined create a strong argument that a
withdrawing lawyer may send a signal to interested third
parties that there is a problem.
Formal Opinion 92-366, however, is new, remains un-
tested, and is predicated upon a comment that was tacitly in-
corporated into the Model Rules. 158 Accordingly, its overall
impact remains unclear. If the Opinion is not overruled or is
merely ignored by members of the ABA, it does provide
Tammy with a limited means of informing Pat of Fulco's ille-
gal conduct. Tammy, however, is able to signal Pat only if
she actually performed work for Fulco related to the illegal
conduct. If she merely stumbled upon the information and
never produced any documents relating to the matter, there
is nothing for Tammy to subsequently disaffirm upon with-
drawal and thus no way for her to "raise the red flag."
C. The California Rules of Professional Conduct
1. Fulco in California
Analyzing the hypothetical example under the current
California Rules is relatively simple in comparison to the
Model Rules. When representing Fulco as an organization,
153. See FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 100. Freedman explains that the com-
ment was adopted at a later meeting without the same attention received by
Model Rule 1.6. Id. Because of this, a small group of ABA members were able
to create the exception and bury it in the comment. Id.
154. See id.
155. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
92-366 (1992).
156. Id.
157. One commentator stated: "Rules prohibiting a lawyer from assisting in
client fraud and requiring a lawyer to cease representation when continuing
would result in any ethical violations may trigger a duty to alert interested
parties of the withdrawal." Randall Samborn, 'Noisy Withdrawal' Held a Duty,
NAT'L L. J., Jan. 18, 1993, at 3.
158. See supra note 153.
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Tammy's duties to Fulco are dictated by California Rule 3-
600.159 This Rule expressly provides that "the member shall
not violate his or her duty of protecting all confidential infor-
mation as provided in Business and Professions Code section
6068, subdivision (e)."160 Under California Business and Pro-
fessions Code section 6068(e),161 Tammy has no right to re-
veal the information regarding the toxic dumping to Pat. In
fact, she is under a strict duty to maintain inviolate the cli-
ent's confidences at all costs. 162 She may withdraw according
to the provisions of California Rule 3-700,163 but there is no
exception in any of the current California Rules that allows
Tammy to reveal Fulco's illegal dumping to Pat.
2. Proposed Rule 3-100
If the California Supreme Court adopts proposed Rule 3-
100,164 it will give lawyers practicing in California two cir-
cumstances where they may reveal confidential information
and not be subject to disciplinary action. The first of these
exceptions is when the client consents to the lawyer revealing
the information. 165 The second, which is similar to Model
Rule 1.6(b)(1), 166 provides.that a member may reveal a confi-
dence or secret "[t]o the extent the member reasonably be-
lieves necessary to prevent the commission of a criminal act
that the member believes is likely to result in death or sub-
stantial bodily harm."' 67 Although the California Rule is dif-
ferent from Model Rule 1.6(b)(1), as there is no requirement
that the resulting death or substantial bodily harm be "immi-
nent,"168 it is still a very limited exception. Even if Tammy
were operating under Proposed Rule 3 _100,169 it would not
159. CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-600 (1989).
160. Id. at Rule 3-600(B).
161. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West Supp. 1994). See also supra
note 80.
162. See supra note 80.
163. CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-600(C) (1989).
See also supra text accompanying notes 80-88.
164. See supra note 78.
165. See supra note 78.
166. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1983).
167. CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-100 (Proposed
Draft 1992).
168. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1983); see
also CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3- 600 (1989).
169. CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-100 (Proposed
Draft 1992).
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provide her any means whereby she could disclose Fulco's
past violations to Pat.
IV. PROPOSAL
It is not enough, nor is it fair, to put the entire burden of
disclosure upon withdrawing counsel. Successor counsel
should share in the responsibility. Because each counsel has
the possibility of incurring liability, each should be charged
with an obligation regarding the transfer of confidential in-
formation between them. Therefore, two Rules are proposed.
The first Rule specifies withdrawing counsel's obligations to
disclose to successor counsel. The second Rule outlines suc-
cessor counsel's duty to discover information from withdraw-
ing counsel. Analyzing the hypothetical example under these
proposed Rules demonstrates how they alleviate the
problems currently surrounding withdrawal and the disclo-
sure of confidential information between withdrawing and
successor counsel.
A. Proposed Rule for Withdrawing Counsel
This Rule would operate as an amendment to Model Rule
1.6.170 A similar version could be adopted into the California
Rules and the ethical rules of other jurisdictions. The pro-
posed Rule, identified by underlined text, could read as
follows:
Proposed Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the ex-
tent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a
criminal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably be-
lieves is likely to result in death or substantial bodily
harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of
the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the
client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil
claim against the lawyer based upon allegations in any
170. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983). Model Rule
1.6 would remain unchanged with the exception of the additions included in the
proposal.
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proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the
client;171 or
(3) to rectify the consequences of a client's crimi-
nal or fraudulent act in the furtherance of which the law-
yer's services had been used;172 or
(4) to, upon withdrawal, inform successor coun-
sel of all conduct by the client reasonably related to the
ongoing representation.
Analyzing the hypothetical example under this Rule, it is
clear that Tammy may inform Pat of Fulco's illegal conduct.
Under Proposed Rule 1.6(b)(4), she could inform him of the
illegal dumping because that information is reasonably re-
lated to the ongoing representation of Fulco.
Proposed Rule 1.6(b)(3) revives 1.6(b)(2) from the Revised
Final Draft of June 1982.173 Proposed Rule 1.6(b)(3) allows a
lawyer to nullify work he or she may have performed for the
client without knowing its illegal nature. Thus, if Tammy
performed services for Fulco that were in furtherance of the
illegal dumping, she is able to release confidential informa-
tion to rectify that harm. Specifically, Tammy may directly
inform those parties affected by the dumping.
Proposed Rule 1.6(b)(1) also supports the conclusion that
Tammy is able to inform Pat of Fulco's illegal conduct. By
including fraudulent, rather than just criminal, acts, and by
eliminating the word "imminent," the Rule is far more expan-
sive. Her effort to prevent the client from continuing to dump
toxic chemicals falls under Proposed Rule 1.6(b)(1) because
the continued practice will eventually result in substantial
bodily harm and/or death to the community residents adja-
cent to the dumping site. Thus, if Tammy reasonably be-
lieves Fulco will continue its illegal dumping, she is able to
inform successor counsel.
B. Proposed Rule for Successor Counsel
The proposed Rule would operate as an amendment to
Model Rule 1.16. l 1" The amendment would read as follows:
171. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1983).
172. Adapted from MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (Re-
vised Final Draft 1982).
173. Id.
174. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16 (1983).
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Proposed Rule 1.16 Declining or Terminating
Representation
(a) When it is reasonable to do so, a lawyer shall not
represent a client whose prior counsel has withdrawn
without first consulting the client's prior counsel regarding
his or her reasons for withdrawing from the
representation. 17
5
This proposal places an affirmative duty on successor counsel
at the very least to attempt to question withdrawing counsel
regarding the reasons behind the termination of the repre-
sentation. If withdrawing counsel's reasons are purely per-
sonal, he or she need only say so. If counsel is withdrawing
due to the client's conduct, however, as in this hypothetical
example, he or she may then disclose the factual circum-
stances surrounding the withdrawal to successor counsel, al-
lowed under Proposed Model Rule 1.6.176 If withdrawing
counsel refuses to disclose the reasons for withdrawal, this
should raise a red flag to successor counsel. Successor coun-
sel can then question the client about the reasons for prior
counsel's withdrawal and decide, based upon the client's re-
sponse, whether to accept the representation.
V. CONCLUSION
Ethical rules promulgated and enforced by the ABA and
state bar associations are designed to provide guidelines for
lawyers. The rules are intended to furnish lawyers with di-
rection when they are faced with ethical dilemmas. Unfortu-
nately, in many areas they have failed to do so. One such
area is disclosure to subsequent counsel upon withdrawal.
During the course of representation, there is no time
when it is more important for lawyers to be clear about their
ethical obligations than at the point where they withdraw
from the representation. This is especially true if the client
has engaged in past illegal activity. Yet the current ethical
codes provide little guidance. It is left to the individual law-
175. The current Model Rule 1.16(a) would become Model Rule 1.16(b). Sim-
ilarly, the rest of the subsections would change their respective subsection let-
ters. There would be no other alteration to Model Rule 1.16.
176. But note that the withdrawing lawyer is bound by Model Rule 4.1 not to
make a false statement regarding why he or she is withdrawing. MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 (1983). If he or she refuses to disclose the
reasons behind the withdrawal, he or she may not make a false statement as to
why he or she is withdrawing.
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yers to read between the lines and to make an educated guess
regarding whether they may disclose to their successors.
The bar associations need to adopt new rules, or amend
those currently promulgated, to better protect the lawyers
who practice under their direction. The modifications sug-
gested in this comment provide substantially greater gui-
dance regarding a lawyer's disclosure obligations to successor
counsel, thus clarifying a lawyer's overall obligations to cli-
ents and enhancing the bar's service to the general public.
Without this type of regulation, lawyers will be forced to con-
tinue to play guessing games regarding their ethical duties.
This type of piecemeal approach helps no one, least of all the
legal profession.
Mark A. Riekhof

